CRIMINAL LAW-DEENDANT
DuTY To CONFORM ACTIONS

INCAPABLE OF COMPREHENDING
TO

DUTY

IMPOSED BY LAW DOES

NOT POSSESS REQUISITE MALICE TO WARRANT MURDER CON-

VICTION; MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED. People V.
Conley (Cal. 1966).
Despondent over romantic failures with one of the victims, the
defendant commenced a three-day period of heavy drinking, during
which time he purchased a rifle, tried it out at a local dump, and
on the evening of the killings departed from the home of his sister
announcing his intent to kill the McCools. A short time later he
returned to his sister's house, stated that he had shot the McCools,
then fled; he was discovered two hours later in a nearby field.
Charged with first degree murder, the defendant testified that he
had no intention of killing the victims and remembered nothing
from the time he was drinking at his sister's house earlier in the
evening until the time of his arrest. A defense psychologist testified
that at the time of the killings, the defendant was in a dissociative
state of mind.' The trial court refused to give manslaughter instructions, ruling that a sufficient cooling period had elapsed, as a matter
of law, to preclude consideration that the crime had been committed
in the heat of passion. The jury found the defendant guilty of two
counts of first degree murder. On appeal to the California Supreme
Court, held, reversed: The failure to give instructions on manslaughter is prejudicial error where there is evidence supporting
theories of the defendant's diminished capacity and intoxication.
People v. Conley, 64 Adv. Cal. 321, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1966).
The grounds for reversal were twofold: (1) California Penal
Code § 222 provides that evidence of intoxication may be offered
1 The term "dissociative"

denotes a separation or isolation of the mental processes

in such a way that they become split off from the main personality or lose their
normal thought-affect relationships. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN
LIFE 660 (3d ed. 1964).
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 22.

No act committed by a person while in the state of voluntary intoxication

is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But when-

ever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a
necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the

jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated
at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he
committed the act.

Generally two factors are necessary to make it mandatory that a judge instruct the
jury in accordance with section 22: (1) The crime must require a specific intent;

and (2) there must be substantial evidence of intoxication. People v. Arriola, 164
Cal. App. 2d 430, 330 P.2d 683 (1958).
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to negate an essential state of mind; and (2) the court's reliance
upon the theory that a mental disease or defect, not amounting to
legal insanity,3 may negate the existence of a requisite element of
a crime. The above theory has evolved from a coalescing of the
holdings of two California landmark decisions in this area, People v.
Wells4 and People v. Gorshen,5 and is now commonly referred to
as the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity. 6 Under this rule,
a defendant, legally sane according to the M'Naughten test, but
suffering from a mental illness that prevents his acting with malice
aforethought or with premeditation and
deliberation, cannot be
7
degree.
first
the
in
murder
of
convicted
In California, under the bifurcated trial procedure,8 a plea of not
3 California, in accord with the majority of American jurisdictions, measures legal
insanity by the hM'Naughien rule. See cases collected in 45 A.L.R.2d 1447, 1452-56
(1956). The rule was originally laid down in M'Naughten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin.
200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843), that if at the time defendant committed the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, that he did not know the nature and quality of his act, or if he did know it, that
he did not know that he was doing what was wrong.
4 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949). Wells held that evidence must be admitted
showing that, at the time a defendant committed an overt act, he did or did not have
a specific mental state such as malice aforethought. Since Wells had not committed a
homicide, but was charged with violating Cal. Pen. Code § 4500, which prescribes
the death penalty when a life prisoner commits an assault with malice aforethought, it
remained until later cases to demonstrate the applicability of the Wells holding to
the manslaughter-murder distinction.
5 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959). Gorshen held that evidence of the defendant's abnormal mental or physical condition, whether caused by intoxication,
trauma, or disease, but not amounting to legal insanity or unconsciousness, could be
considered in a murder case to rebut malice aforethought and intent to kill. Gorshen
overruled previous decisions holding that the question of whether the defendant
was guilty of murder or manslaughter is to bp decided solely on the basis of the
reasonable man standard of provocation. It also overruled cases holding that voluntary
intoxication could not be considered on the question of whether the defendant is
guilty of murder or manslaughter.
6 "The rule of the Wells and Gorshen decisions is sometimes inaccurately referred
to as a rule of 'partial insanity' or 'partial responsibility.' This way of describing the
rule is inaccurate because the question is not whether the defendant is or is not
responsible; the question is whether he had the mental state that is an essential
element of the crime charged. Voluntary intoxication does not make a defendant
unaccountable under the crminal law, but it may show that he did not have thq
intent required for the crime of which he is accused. The Wells-Gorshen rule is
simply an application of that principle to the situation where it is the defendant's
mental condition, rather than his state of intoxication, that renders him incapable of
forming the required intent or possessing the required mental state." Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders 29 (1st Rep. 1962), noted in People v.
Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 365 n.7, 406 P.2d 43, 52, n.7, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 772 n.7
(1965).
7 People v. Ford, 65 Adv. Cal.
(1966) ; People v. Conley, 64 Adv.
820 (1966); People v. Henderson,
Rptr. 77, 82 (1963).
8 The bifurcated trial procedure

30, 43, 416 P.2d 132, 140, 52 Cal. Rptr. 226, 236
Cal. 321, 330, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
60 Cal. 2d 482, 490-91, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal.
is a product of the correlated reading of Cal. Pen.
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guilty by reason of insanity permits two attacks upon the prosecution's
case. In the first trial only the general issues raised by a not guilty
plea are tried; and evidence material to the insanity of the accused
must be introduced in the second trial in accordance with the
M'Naughten rules. The M'Naughten "right and wrong" test remained the sole basis for a defense of mental disorder in California
until the 1949 Wells decision. Prior to this time, the trial courts had
considered psychiatric evidence as dealing exclusively with the question of legal insanity and therefore deferred its admission until the
second trial.9 The courts had also construed sections 101610 and
10261 of the Penal Code as conclusively presuming that a defendant
possessed the mental capacity for the required specific criminal intent,
in addition to conclusively presuming that he was legally sane for
the first trial. 2 The Wells court held, however, that evidence of a
mental disorder short of legal insanity, including psychiatric
testimony, was admissible under the not guilty plea to disprove a
specific mental state.'3
Code §§ 1016 and 1026, whereby if a defendant pleads "not guilty" and "not guilty
by reason of insanity," the first trial is held on the issue of guilt, and in this trial
the defendant is conclusively presumed sane; then, if he is found guilty, the second
trial'is held on the issue of sanity. For a history of this procedure and a plea for its
abolition, see Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF.
'L. R v. 805 (1961).
9 See generally, Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STA. L.
REv. 59, 74 (1961).
10 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016.

There are five kinds of pleas to an indictment or an information, or to a
complaint charging an offense triable in any inferior court.
1. Guilty.

2. Not guilty.
3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged.
4. Once in jeopardy.
5. Not guilty by reason of insanity.
A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of the other
pleas. A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall
be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission
of the offense charged; provided, that the court may for good cause shown
allow a change of plea at any time before the commencement of the trial. A

defendant who pleads guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not
guilty, thereby admits the commission of the offense charged.
11 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026.

When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also joins with
it another plea or pleas, he shall first be tried as if he entered such other
plea or pleas only, and in such trial he shall be conclusively presumed to have
been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed ...
12 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 200 Cal. App. 2d 838, 842, 19 Cal. Rptr. 743, 745
(1962).
13 "Evidence which tends to show legal insanity (likewise, sanity) is not admissible at the first stage of the trial because it is not pertinent to any issue then being
litigated; but competent evidence, other than proof of sanity or insanity which tends
to show that a (then presumed) legally sane defendant either did or did not in fact
possess the required specific intent or motive is admissible." 33 Cal. 2d at 351, 202
P.2d at 66.
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Although Wells opened the door to the defense of diminished
capacity under the not guilty plea, the scope and application of the
defense remained undetermined until the court in Gorshen stated:
It would seem elementary that a plea of not guilty to a charge of
murder puts in issue the existence of particular mental states which
are essential elements of the two degrees of murder and of manslaughter .... Accordingly, it appears only fair and reasonable that
defendant should be allowed to show that in fact, subjectively, he
did not possess the mental state or states in issue.14
The objective finding of provocation sufficient to reduce murder to
manslaughter is not, by the Gorshen ruling, the sole means by which
malice can be negated and voluntary manslaughter established. One
who intentionally kills may be subjectively incapable of harboring
malice aforethought because of a mental disease, defect or intoxication, and in such case his killing, unless justified or excused, is
voluntary manslaughter.1 5
As noted in Conley,16 manslaughter instructions may not be necessary in a felony-murder case in which diminished capacity and
intoxication are relied on by the defense. Subsequent to Conley,
People v. Ford7 recognized that, pursuant to the Conley rule,
manslaughter instructions must be given in spite of the felonymurder rule in cases involving any factual dispute as to whether the
homicide was committed during the perpetration of a relevant felony,
or in those cases where the issue of diminished capacity or intoxication
is raised as a defense to the felony charge as well as the murder
18
charge.
The court in the instant case did more than reiterate and reaffirm
the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity. It went further, and
through the vehicle of "malice aforethought," introduced the concept
of social awarenessto California law. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking
for the court, stated:
An intentional act that is highly dangerous to human life, done in
disregard of the actor's awareness that society requires him to conform his conduct to the law is done with malice regardless of the
fact that the actor acts without ill will toward his victim or believes
that his conduct is justified. In this respect it is immaterial that he
14
15
16
17
18

51
64
Id.
65
Id.

Cal. 2d at 733, 336 P.2d at 502.
Adv. Cal. at 329, 411 P.2d at 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
at 335 n.4, 411 P.2d at 920 n.4, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 824 n.4.
Adv. Cal. 30, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
at 47 n.9, 416 P.2d at 143 n.9, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.9.
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does not know that his specific conduct is unlawful, for all persons

are presumed to know the law including that which prohibits
causing injury or death to another. An awareness of the obligation
to act within the general body of laws regulating society, however,
is included in the statutory definition of implied malice in terms
of an abandoned and malignant heart and in the definition of
express malice as the deliberate intention unlawfully to take a
life.' 9 (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, if because of mental defect, disease or intoxication a
defendant is unable to comprehend his duty imposed by law, he
does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty of
murder 2
Conley is distinguishable from Wells and Gorshen, in that pursuant
to the latter two cases, relevant evidence of a defendant's diminished
capacity must be admitted under a not guilty plea when the crime
charged requires a specific mental intent, whereas the social awareness concept expounded by Conley extends only to the element of
malice aforethought. Reference is intended to "malice aforethought"
as defined in sections 18721 and 18822 of the Penal Code and not
"malice" as defined in Penal Code § 7 (4) ,23 which the court cautioned
should not even be read to the jury in a murder case.24 From the
restrictive nature of the court's opinion, it would appear that the
extention of the concept of social awareness to a crime other than
one involving malice aforethought would be difficult unless the
court should intend the definition of "malice aforethought" used
in homicide cases2 5 to be equivalent to the definition of "malice" set
19 64 Adv. Cal. at 526, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
20

Ibid.

21 CAL. PEN. CODE § 187.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.

22 CAL. PEN. CODE § 188.

Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is expressed when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when
the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart.

23 CAL. PEN. CODE § 7(4).

The words "malice" and "maliciously" import a wish to vex, annoy, or
injure another person, or the intent to do a wrongful act, established either
by proof or presumption of law.
24 64 Adv. Cal. at 331, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22; accord, People v.
Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d at 730-31, 336 P.2d at 501 ("The contents of the word 'malice'
in the statutes specifically relating to homicide shows that the word means something
more than the word imports as defined in section 7.... " [section 7 definition should
not be read to a jury in a murder case]). But see, People v. Berry, 44 Cal. 2d 426,
432, 282 P.2d 861, 864 (1955) (held erroneous, but not prejudicial, to read section
7's definition of "malice" in a homicide case).
25 See statutes cited notes 21 and 22 supra.
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forth in the other penal laws of California. 26 In effect, such extention

would completely disregard the specific definition given to "malice"
by the Legislature.
The contribution made by Conley to California law is the establishment of a test for distinguishing murder from manslaughter when

the defendant is mentally impaired, but not impaired to such an
extent that he could be relived of criminal responsibility under the
M'Naughten test. The achievement of Conley is an engraftment
upon the M'Naughten rule in a murder case whereby a defendant
may have his punishment reduced, but not be exculpated completely
of criminal responsibility. The prerequisite for the application of
this test is a mental condition sufficiently impaired to prevent the
defendant's comprehending the duty to govern his actions in accord-

ance with the law, yet not so impaired as to prevent him from
knowing right from wrong.
While the California courts refuse to disregard 27 the M'Naughten
test, or hold it unconstitutional, 8 they have not been unresponsive
to a liberalization of its original language. 9 Such modifications,
26

See statute cited note 23 supra.

27 See, e.g., People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 49, 338 P.2d 416, 424 (1959).

By their decision on the insanity plea the jury are to some extent expressing
ancient convictions that society can properly punish the man who offends it
because the punishment is a sort of justified collective purge or vengeance;
a purge to rid society of the offender and thereby protect it, and vengeance
to show retribution on the transgressor, and thereby to deter others and
protect society. . . . [S]uch long established convictions cannot be adjudicated
out of existence ....
28 See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 802-03, 394 P.2d 959, 963, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 271, 275 (1964). The Wolff court made it clear that the California Al'Naughten
Rule does not unconstitutionally deprive a defendant of due process and equal protection under the law. It strongly relied on Mr. Justice Clark's statement in Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952) that "knowledge of right and wrong is
the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in the majority of American jurisdictions.
The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that test was laid down
in M'Naughten's Case, but the progress of science has not reached a point where its
learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate the right and wrong test
from their criminal law." (Footnotes omitted.) Justice Schauer, speaking for the Irlolff
majority, stated that "amicus curiae urges that now, 12 years after Leland, scientific
knowledge has reached that point. But the extent and nature of advances in psychiatric
knowledge are not shown and we are not persuaded that they have been of such a
revolutionary scope as to undermine the holding in Leland." 61 Cal. 2d at 802, 394
P.2d at 963, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
29 People v. Wolff, supra note 28, at 800, 394 P.2d at 962, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
The court observes that the California version of the test is not the narrow, literal
one which appeared in AMNaughten's Case. Through such phrases as "know and
understand," the California courts have liberalized the test so as to require a realization or appreciation of the wrongful nature of the act. Additional cases that illustrate
the liberalization of the original wording are: People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 351,
202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949) ("to know the nature of his act and appreciate that it was
wrongful and could subject him to punishment"); People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306,
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however, still leave unanswered many of the problems and criticisms
of the test 30

Although M'Naughten remains the sole test to completely absolve
a defendant of criminal responsibility, when the Wells-Gorshen rule
of diminished capacity and the Conley contribution of social awareness are tacked to M'Naughten, it would appear that California
has taken a unique, yet practical approach to the problem of mental
impairment and the effect it will have on criminal responsibility
and punishment in a murder case.
The concept of social awareness as a necessary element of malice
aforethought seems to be a derivative of the formula for determining
criminal responsibility adopted by Chief Judge Biggs in United
States v. Currens.3 1 Following a thorough treatment of the pros
32
and cons of the M'Naughten and Durham
rules, the court stated:
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the
prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law which he is alleged to have violated.33

In adopting this formula the Currens court relied strongly upon
the Model Penal Code, 4 but refused to accept a particular phrase
314, 240 Pac. 1000, 1004 (1925) ("he appreciated the nature and quality of the
act") ; People v. Morisawa, 180 Cal. 148, 150, 179 Pac. 888, 890 (1919) ("if the
defendant . . . did not appreciate the act he was committing"); People v. Willard,
150 Cal. 543, 554, 89 Pac. 124, 129 (1907) ("if he understands the nature and
character of his actions and its consequences").
30 The most serious faults of the M'Naughten test have recently been summarized
by Circuit Judge Kaufmann in his scholarly opinion in United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1966), as being (1) that it is too narrow in scope, focusing
only on the cognitive aspect of the personality, that is, the ability to know right from
wrong; (2) that it is unrealistic in that it fails to recognize degrees of incapacity; and
(3) that it places "unrealistically tight shacldes" on the scope and range of expert
psychiatric testimony.
81 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
32 The Durham rule was announced in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862,
874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the court held that a defendant was not responsible
"if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." The Durham
decision has brought forth an extensive amount of law review commentary. For
example, see a symposium with articles by doctors Rosche, Guttmacher, Zilboorg and
Wertham, and by lawyers de Grazia, Weihofen, Wechsler, Hill and Katz. Insanity and
the Criminal Law-A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 317
(1955). See also, Clements, Criminal Insanity: A Criticism of the New York Rule,
20 ALBANY L. REv. 155 (1956); Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From
AlcNaughten to Durham and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955); 54 COLum. L. REv.
1153 (1954) ; 40 CORNELL L.Q. 135 (1954); 68 HARY. L. REv. 364 (1954); 30 IND.
I.J. 194 (1955); 33 TEx. L. Rav. 482 (1955).
33 290 F.2d at 774.
34 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1).

A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
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because of its overemphasis of the cognitive element in criminal
responsibility. 5 This refusal has been criticized by Judge Kaufman
in United States v. Freeman, in which the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted in haec verba section 4.01 of the Model Penal
Code as the test for criminal responsibility.36 The Freeman court
pointed out that the basic objection to the M'Naughten rules "was
not that they looked to the cognitive feature of the personality, undeniably a significant aspect37of the total man, but that they looked
to this element exclusively."
Thus, in a limited way, Conley has introduced into California law
the theory of criminal responsibility as promulgated by the Model
Penal Code. However, the requirement of social awareness as a
prerequisite to malice aforethought would seem to limit its application to the crime of murder, unless expanded by some other vehicle
into other areas of criminal law. The Conley approach employs a
circumvention of the most serious defects of M'Naughten, as opposed
to a complete abrogation, and may prove a practical approach to
supplying a more rational application of psychiatry to law. Society
may well be more willing to accept a less stringent test of mental
capacity where the result is not to excuse the perpetrator, but rather
to mitigate his punishment.
DAvID W. AJLT
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
35 290 F.2d at 774 n.32 (The court rejected the phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.").
30 357 F.2d at 622 n.52. The Second Circuit in Freeman adopted the word "wrongfulness" in section 4.01 as the American Law Institute's suggested alternative to
"criminality" because they wished to include the case where the perpetrator appreciates that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a delusion, believes it to be
morally justified.
37 Id. at 624.

